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I. INTRODUCTION 
Amidst the decline of public confidence in the capacity of the American legal 
system to resolve complex and technical issues, the United States Supreme 
Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.2 In this landmark 
decision, the Supreme Court replaced the "general acceptance" test3 and 
formulated a criterion that established scientific validity as the measure for 
reliable opinions based on scientific explanations.4 Rule 702 of the Ohio Rules 
of Evidence follows the course charted by Daubert and challenges judges and 
lawyers to appreciate how science works and, to some degree, engage 
intellectually in the methodology of scientific thinking.s 
2Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The interpretive 
disagreements over Daubert have been intense. Since Daubert, articles and public 
commentary on the admissibility of scientific evidence have flooded law reviews and 
journals. One year after the decision, the Federal Judicial Center published THE 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SciENTIFIC EVIDENCE (Federal Judicial Center ed., 1994) 
(hereinafter "Reference Manual"). The Reference Manual was designed to assist federal 
judges in dealing with issues of science and technology; and it too has been subjected 
to heavy criticism. See, e.g., Lee Loevinger, Commentan; on Evidentiary Framework, 36 
JURIMETRICS J. 149-58 (1996) (arguing that the Reference Manual's chapter on evidentiary 
framework fails to adhere to the rigorous discipline inherent in the scientific process). 
3See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that expert opinions 
based on scientific principles or techniques are inadmissible unless the scientific 
principle or discovery has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific 
community). 
4See discussion infra Part II.A. For an excellent description of the difference between 
validity and reliability see Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1111 n.9 
(5th Cir. 1991 ); see also Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 595 (1988). Black explains that validity and reliability "are very different concepts." 
I d. at 599. "Reliability means that a successful outcome, or a correct answer, is sufficiently 
probable for a given situation .... In contrast ... , validity means that which results 
from sound and cogent reasoning. An invalid conclusion cannot be reliable, yet valid 
reasoning does not necessarily lead to reliable conclusions." Id. Black asserts, 
[T]he scientific question [should be viewed] as a matter of validity, with 
the answer depending on accepted scientific practice and the soundness 
and cogency of the entire pattern of reasoning leading to the expert's con-
clusion. In contrast, the legal question relates to how much reliability 
the law requires, with the answer depending on legal standards. 
Id. at 600. 
5The Court determined that the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence were 
at odds with the rigid "general-acceptance" requirement enunciated in Frye. Thus, the 
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The State of Ohio amended Rule 702 in 1994 to include Daubert's concept of 
scientific reliability. Notice, however, the staff note to amended Rule 702 
maintains that case law prior to Daubert provides an acceptable basis for 
establishing reliability.6 Consequently, current Ohio law differs somewhat from 
federal law and the Daubert Court's focus on empirical analysis. This article 
looks at the differences between the federal system and Ohio's more flexible 
management of scientific evidence and the interplay between state and federal 
case law. 
Legal commentators trumpeted Daubert as the definitive anti-junk science 
decision? Daubert emphasized that the focus of a federal judge's inquiry "must 
be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they 
generate."S However, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,9 the Supreme Court backed 
away from this position and permitted a federal judge to examine the reasoning 
process linking methodology to the expert's conclusions.lO joiner affirmed the 
discretionary authority of a federal judge to reject an expert's rationale, even 
where the methods and principles which formed the expert's opinion are 
Court concluded that the "general acceptance" standard was incompatible with the 
Federal Rules: "That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
6 Although the staff notes to Rule 702 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence intend otherwise, 
these passages have generated confusion regarding the interpretation and application 
of Rule 702: 
[W]ith the intention to do no more than codify existing holdings on 
the admissibility of expert testimony, the amended rule does not 
attempt to define the standard of reliability but leaves that to further 
development through case law. The amendment also leaves un-
changed Ohio's rejection of Frye as the exclusive standard of reliability. 
Similarly, the amendment does not purport to supplant existing case 
law as to the acceptable means of showing reliability, whether through 
judicial notice or testimony. Further, the law remains unchanged that 
the inquiry as to reliability is appropriately directed, not to the correct-
ness or credibility of the conclusions reached by the expert witness, 
but to the reliability of the principles and methods used to reach those 
conclusions. 
7"Daubert came to the right result; it's an anti-junk science opinion." Paul Reidinger, 
They Blinded Me with Science, ABA J. 58,59 (1996) (quoting Professor Imwinkelreid, law 
professor at the University of California, Davis, and prolific author on scientific 
evidence). Professor lmwinkelreid adds that if an expert's opinions are based on 
scientific evidence, then the witness must show the court that the opinions were reached 
in a manner similar to other scientists in the same discipline. Id. 
BDaubert, 509 U.S. at 595. The majority opinion expressed confidence that federal 
judges possess the capacity to assess the validity of whether reasoning or methodology 
underlying scientific testimony is valid and whether the reasoning or methodology can 
be applied to the facts at issue. Id. A close review of the Reference Manual suggests 
otherwise. See Reference Manual supra note 2. 
9General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997). 
10 Id. at 519 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595). 
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recognized as valid. Finally, in Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichae[,ll the Supreme 
Court applied Daubert not only to scientific testimony, but to all expert 
witnesses including non-scientific experts who rely on skill or experience to 
formulate opinions.12 
Ohio's approach to the admissibility of expert opinions differs from the 
federal system's approach to the admissibility of expert opinions.13 Under the 
federal system, the determination of scientific validity rests exclusively with 
the trial judge, whereas Ohio divides the responsibility of determining 
reliability between judge and jury.14 Moreover, Ohio's definition of reliability 
is less restrictive and scientific than Daubert. Ohio measures the reliability of 
expert opinions by applying a relevancy standard and inquiring into the 
validity of the principles or methods upon which the opinions are based.15 In 
stark contrast to the approaches taken in Joiner and Kumho, Ohio courts do not 
evaluate the validity of the logic behind the expert's conclusions. Here's 
another important difference between the federal and Ohio systems: federal 
juries are afforded liberal access to learned treatises; and consequently, they 
have access to critical insight and information about new, advanced medical 
and scientific knowledge.16 By contrast, the Ohio Supreme Court has only 
recently eased the restrictions on courtroom use of learned treatises.l7 Note too, 
that the Daubert Court evaluated the admissibility of expert testimony taken 
only from experts in the fields of the basic sciences, which commonly employ 
llKumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, No. 97-1709, 1999 WL 152455, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 23, 
1999). 
l2Jd. at *1. 
l3See discussion infra Part II.B. regarding the relevance/reliability approach. 
l4Jn McCubbin v. Michigan Ladder Co., 679 N.E.2d 1142 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) the 
court noted a conflict between Ohio's amended Rule 702( c) and prior case law. I d. 643-45. 
The court found the staff note confusing because prior case law compels the trial court 
to submit questions of reliability of the opinion of expert witnesses to the jury. Id. The 
McCubbin decision raises questions about a greater role for trial judges in admitting 
scientific testimony, in view of the amendment that added the word "reliability" to Rule 
702 and encouraged reliance on Daubert. See id. at 643-44. 
l5See State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1338 (Ohio 1998). See also discussion infra 
Section II(B)(5). 
I d. 
l6See FED. R. Evro. 803 (18): 
Learned Treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert 
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness 
in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, 
periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other 
science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or 
admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial 
notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but 
may not be received as exhibits. 
17 See Omo Evro. R. 706. See also discussion infra Section IV .A. 
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the principles of empirical analysis.lB Ohio Rule 702, however, comprehends 
the admissibility of all expert testimony, especially physician opinions, and the 
methodology underlying their opinions.l9 Finally, Ohio's case-by-case method 
of determining the threshold level of reliability of expert testimony differs from 
the federal requirement that all expert testimony must pass the Daubert test to 
be admissible. This distinction marks the major difference between Ohio's 
approach to the admissibility of expert opinions and Daubert's approach to the 
admissibility of expert opinions. 
This article specifically examines the reliability standard imposed under 
Rule 702 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence and its application to medical expert 
testimony in Ohio. Section II reviews Daubert, its progeny, and Ohio law. This 
analysis reveals tension between Ohio's flexible relevance/ reliability standard 
and the more exacting demands of Daubert. Section III examines the scientific 
basis of clinical diagnosis and treatment of illness and disease. This section 
argues that judges should take judicial notice of the conventional methodology 
underlying the clinical practice of medicine, and thus the preliminary question 
of reliability of medical expert testimony should rarely require a Daubert 
hearing. Section IV discusses the reliability of medical and scientific literature 
and the criteria establishing its use by experts and attorneys in the courtroom. 
II. DAUBERT AND ITS PROGENY-IMPACT ON OHIO LAW 
A. The Daubert Decision 
To better appreciate the rationale of Daubert, it is useful to review 
Petitioner-Plaintiff's scientific basis for associating the drug Bendectin to birth 
defects. At trial, Plaintiff's expert employed three forms of scientific evidence 
to establish Bendectin's role in causing Plaintiff's injury: in vitro (test tube) and 
in vivo (live animal) studies linking Bendectin to malformations;20 chemical 
structure analysis comparing the similarities between substances known to 
18See, e.g., Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299,303-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting 
that empirical testing distinguishes science from other fields of inquiry); United States 
v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038-41 (S.D.N.Y 1995) (asserting that Daubert is 
limited to scientific testimony). 
19Incidentally, Kumho applied a Daubert analysis to all types of expert witnesses, just 
as Ohio analyzes scientific and non-scientific witnesses. See discussion infra Section liLA. 
Commentators fortified with a scientific background clarify their focus on scientific 
evidence by separating science from other forms of knowledge. They also concentrate 
on how scientists establish validity. See, e.g., Bert Black eta!., Science and the Law in the 
Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REv. 715, 754-55 (1994) 
(outlining three characteristic traits distinguishing scientific knowledge from other 
forms of knowledge). Science seeks systematic organization of information; it tries to 
explain why observed conditions and events occur; and it requires that "[s]cientific 
explanations ... be formulated in such a way that they can be subjected to empirical 
testing, a process that has to include the possibility of empirical falsification." !d. at 755. 
20 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582-85. 
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cause birth defects and Bendectin;21 and a reanalysis of previously published 
epidemiology studies.22 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, 
Respondent-Defendant asserted that Petitioner-Plaintiff's expert failed to 
employ sufficient scientific evidence to support the expert's opinion that 
Bendectin caused Plaintiff's birth deformities. The United States Supreme 
Court sided with Petitioner-Plaintiff, rejected the Frye Court's "general 
acceptance" standard23 as the sole test of reliability, and presumably expanded 
the parameters for admission of scientific evidence. 
Where scientific knowledge provides the foundation of an expert's opinion, 
Daubert requires the trial judge to investigate whether the expert relied on 
scientifically valid methodology.24 To aid in this determination, the Supreme 
Court discussed a non-exhaustive list of factors: 1) whether the principle and 
methodology is subject to empirical testing; 2) whether the principle and 
methodology has been subject to peer review and publication, noting that 
publication is a lesser element of peer review; 3) the known or potential rate of 
error of a particular scientific method; and 4) general acceptance, or at least the 
degree in which the relevant scientific community supports the methodology 
or principle, may carry great weight.25 
General Electric v. Joiner,26 however, undermined the assumption that 
Daubert relaxed the admissibility standard for scientific evidence. The Joiner 
Court reviewed a district court's findings with respect to the animal and 
epidemiology studies used by Respondent's expert to support the theory that 
exposure to PCBs promoted the development of Respondent's lung cancer.27 
Restating the findings of the district court, the Supreme Court noted that the 
results of the animal studies showed PCBs caused tumors identified as 
alveologenic adenomas, a type of cancer not typically found in the lung.28 The 
Court also reiterated the district court's conclusion that the epidemiology 
studies failed to demonstrate a "statistically significant link between lung 
cancer and PCBs."29 
21Jd. 
22Jd. The expert relied on data in published epidemiology studies that found no 
causal link between the drug and birth defects. In the courtroom, the expert used the 
same data to draw a conclusion different from conclusions drawn by the authors. ld. 
23See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
24"In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon 
scientific validity." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. 
25Jd. at 591-93. 
26General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997). 
27[d. at 518. 
28[d. 
29Jd. at 519. 
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The Supreme Court consequently reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals and concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district 
court to reject the expert's reliance on those studies.30 The Court permitted the 
trial court to investigate the validity of the methods employed by an expert or 
the validity of the reasoning process or inferences drawn from available data. 
The Court observed: "The studies were so dissimilar to the facts presented in 
this litigation that it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to have 
rejected the experts' reliance on them. "31 The Joiner Court finally held, " [a] court 
may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data 
and the opinion proffered .... That is what the District Court did here, and we 
hold that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing."32 After Joiner, only an abuse 
of discretion gives an appellate court grounds to reverse the decisions of a trial 
judge. Consequently, whenever the trial judge detects any analytical gaps in 
the extrapolation between "data and opinions proffered," a legitimate reason 
to exclude the testimony exists, and thus, the testimony may be excluded.33 
The Supreme Court's most recent foray into the issues surrounding the 
admissibility of expert testimony took place in Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. 
Carmichae[.34 This case seems to have momentarily ended the debate over the 
application of Daubert's factor test to expert testimony grounded in the soft 
sciences and experience or skill-based methodology. In Kumho, the right rear 
tire of a minivan driven by Mr. Carmichael blew out, causing an accident that 
killed one passenger and severely injured others.35 The Carmichael family 
brought a diversity suit against the tire maker and its distributor, claiming that 
the tire was defective.36 At trial, the Carmichaels produced an expert who had 
a master's degree in engineering and ten years experience in the tire industry. 
Although the tire was badly worn and, in some spots, treadbare, the expert 
relied on a visual and tactile test to determine that the tire lacked signs of 
abuse.37 Consequently, he testified that, based on his experience, the tire failure 
was caused by a design defect.38 
30Jd. at 519. 
31 Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 518. 
32Jd. at 519 (citing Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharrn., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992)). 
33Jd. The petitioners also appealed the Eleventh Circuit's application of a uniquely 
stringent standard of review of the District Court's exclusion of expert testimony. The 
Supreme Court found, "[a]buse of discretion-the standard ordinarily applicable to 
review of evidentiary rulings-is the proper standard by which to review a district 
court's decision to admit or exclude expert scientific evidence." ld. at 514. 
34Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, No. 97-1709, 1999 WL 152455, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 23, 
1999). 
35Jd. at *4. 
36Jd. 
37[d. 
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The Carmichaels rested the bulk of their case on the testimony of their expert. 
It was no surprise then that the defendants moved the district court to exclude 
the expert's testimony on the ground that his methodology failed the reliability 
requirement of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.39 Applying the 
reliability-related factors found in Daubert, the trial court agreed with the 
defendants that it should act as a gatekeeper and keep out the expert's 
technical, rather than scientific, evidence.40 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, 
saying that Daubert explicitly applies only where an expert relies on the 
application of scientific principles, rather than on skill or experience-based 
observations.41 The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and agreed 
with the trial court, noting that Daubert's relevancy factors should be 
considered whenever they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert 
testimony.42 In instances where empirical analysis may not be suitable to 
determine the reliability of an expert's methodology, for example, experience 
and skill-based methodology, the court must make certain that the witness 
employs the same "intellectual rigor" that defines the expertise of practitioners 
in the relevant field. 
Undoubtedly, after Kumho, treacherous terrain lies ahead for expert 
witnesses. Because the Kumho Court directs judges to consider whether the 
Daubert factors constitute a "reasonable measure" of the reliability of an expert's 
methodology, judges are free to exclude any expert testimony that lacks a 
reasonable measure of reliability. 
Under Daubert, innovative theories premised on valid laboratory tests and 
experiments were in all likelihood safe from judicial review.43 Joiner and Kumho, 
however, grant federal judges enormous discretion to reject any expert opinion 
they dislike. 
B. The Development of Ohio's Relevance/Reliability Standard 
In Ohio, although the guidelines covering the admissibility of most expert 
testimony-including physicians-falls under the first sentence of Rule 702(C), 
confusion persists because Ohio case law decided before the amendment of 
38Jd. 
39Kumho, WL 152455, at *6. 
40Jd. at *6. 
41Jd. at *7. 
42Jd. at *9. 
43Qf course, this statement assumes that innovative theories premised on valid 
laboratory tests and experiments, with nothing more, satisfy the focus of Rule 702. 
The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. Its 
overarching subject is the scientific validity-and thus the evidentiary 
relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed sub-
mission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and method-
ology, not on the conclusions that they generate. 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95. See also discussion infra Part liLA. 
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Rule 702 continues to be an acceptable means of establishing the reliability of 
expert opinions.44 The staff note announced "there is no intention to change 
existing Ohio law determining the reliability of expert testimony."45 Thus, 
when considering the admissibility of scientific and medical evidence in Ohio, 
one must look to the law prior to the amendment of Rule 702 to understand 
how State v. Williams,46 State v. Pierce,47 and State v. Bresson48 have shaped 
Ohio's evidentiary framework. 
1. State v. Williams-The Birth of Ohio's Relevance/Reliability Standard 
Over a decade before the amendment of Rule 702, the Ohio Supreme Court 
abandoned the Frye test49 in State v. Williams.50 In Williams, the court addressed 
the admissibility of spectrographic voice analysis used to convict a defendant 
on charges of aggravated burglary, felonious assault, and attempted rape. The 
body of the decision cited Professor McCormick's criticism of Frye: "general 
scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific 
facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence."Sl The court 
endorsed a more flexible approach, the "relevance/reliability" standard.52 The 
44Rule 702 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence states in relevant part: 
Testimony by Experts .... 
(C) The witness' testimony is based on reliable scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized information. To the extent that the testimony 
reports the result of a procedure, test, or experiment, the testimony is 
reliable only if all of the following apply: 
(1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is 
based is objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widely 
accepted knowledge, facts, or principles; 
(2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliably imple-
ments the theory; 
(3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in 
a way that will yield an accurate result. 
OHIO Evro. R. 702. Thus, the amendment to Rule 702 seems to apply to all expert 
witnesses and the basis underlying expert opinions, whether or not their conclusions 
have anything to do with science. 
450HIO Evm. R. 702 staff note. 
46State v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio 1983). 
47State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107, 115 (Ohio 1992), superseded by rule as stated in 
State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332 (Ohio 1998). 
48State v. Bresson, 554 N.E.2d 1330 (Ohio 1990). 
49See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
50Williams, 446 N.E.2d at 444. The opinion notes that the Supreme Court never 
formally adopted the Frye test. However, "general acceptance" was the standard 
followed by the lower courts. Id. at 447 n.5. 
51Jd. at 447. 
52According to Professor Giannelli, the birth of the relevance/reliability approach 
can be traced to Professor McCormick. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel 
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court summed up its position by asserting that "any relevant conclusions which 
are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are 
other reasons for exclusion."53 Following the trend set by a few federal 
jurisdictions, the Ohio Supreme Court sought to avoid the harsh restriction of 
Frye's "general acceptance" test.54 
Rules 402, 403, and 702 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence constituted the basis 
of Williams's version of the relevance/ reliability standard.55 Rule 402 provided 
that all relevant evidence was admissible unless excluded by constitutional 
mandates or in conflict with statutes or other rules.56 Rule 702, prior to the 1994 
amendment, authorized the admissibility of scientific evidence by qualified 
witnesses if the testimony assisted the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or determine a fact in issue.57 Finally, Rule 403 operated to exclude scientific 
Scientific Evidence: Fryev. United StatesaHalfCentury Later, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 1197,1223 
(1980). Giannelli explains that the first step in applying the relevance/reliability 
approach is the determination of the probative value of the evidence, which turns on a 
determination of whether the evidence has a tendency to make the existence of a fact 
more or less probable. Id. Secondly, the potential to mislead the jury must be evaluated, 
and lastly this danger must be balanced against the probative value of the proffered 
evidence. Id. at 1232-1239. In contrast to the approach taken in Daubert, the 
relevance/reliability approach limits the trial judge to screening scientific evidence 
while the jury must evaluate the reliability of the evidence and ultimately its probative 
value. For further commentary on the relevance/reliability approach and its limitations 
to effectively deal with scientific evidence, see Bert Black et al., supra note 19 (arguing 
that the relevance/ reliability approach is a flawed shortcut to determining the probative 
value of scientific evidence); see also Jay P. Kesan, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a 
Post-Daubert World, 84 GEO. L.J., 1985 (1996) (analyzing flaws found in the 
relevance/reliability approach). "By admitting all relevant scientific evidence, any 
disagreements or significant doubts about a testifying expert's methodology are treated 
as issues going to weight and credibility, rather than admissibility, of the evidence." I d. 
at 1995. 
53 Williams, 694 N.E.2d at 447. 
54 See, e.g.,United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,439 U.S. 
1117 (1978) (rejecting strict application of Frye and substituting it for the relevancy test); 
Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (questioning the 
development of a homemade test for admissibility when the expert opinion testimony 
was correctly excluded because the majority found it substantially more prejudicial than 
probative); and United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990) (holding the 
reliability of DNA evidence outweighed increased potential of unfairly prejudicing the 
jury). 
55 Williams, 694 N.E.2d at 447-49. Professor Giannelli makes the point that the issue 
of probative value begins with the definition of relevant evidence found in Federal Rule 
401. The federal rule is identical to rule 401 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence. Both define 
relevant evidence to mean: "Evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." Giannelli, supra note 41, at 1235-36. 
560Hio Evm. R. 402. 
57 See OHIO Evrn. R. 702, staff note (discussing that the "assist the trier of fact" standard 
had been uninformative and had misled judges and attorneys). In short, the note states 
that a threshold standard of reliability determined by references to the methods and 
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evidence only in the rare occasion where the evidence's probative value is 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. 58 
In comparison to Daubert, the Williams relevance/ reliability standard weighs 
a preliminary finding of the relevance of scientific evidence against its 
prejudicial effect. Given this approach, scientific validity lacks significance 
because the trial judge balances probity against prejudice rather than 
investigating the validity of the methods relied upon by the experts to reach an 
opinion. Commentary critical of the relevance/reliability approach seems even 
more constructive after Daubert.59 The relevance/reliability standard treats 
"reliability of the evidence and the validity of the underlying scientific 
methodology as aspects of relevancy.60 Since this approach relegates scientific 
validity to a secondary role, the qualifications of the expert witness surfaces as 
the principal influence on resolving the issue of reliability.61 Consequently, 
from a practical standpoint, highly qualified experts possess more persuasive 
power with juries. Thus, the more qualified the expert, the more reliable the 
testimony. Because the application of Ohio's relevance/reliability standard 
relies so heavily on the qualifications of experts, only a broader latitude in the 
cross-examination of experts can illuminate the long shadow of impeccable 
credentials potentially hiding speculative conclusions.62 
2. State v. Pierce-Generally Recognized Test 
Daubert did not "read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply to all scientific 
techniques."63 Prior to Daubert, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Pierce 
principles employed by experts in reaching their conclusions replaces "assist the trier 
of fact" language. If, as the staff note states, Ohio case law remains unchanged, the 
threshold question of reliability must be balanced against undue prejudice. 
58 Rule 403 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence permits exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion or undue delay. See OHIO Evro. R. 403. Nearly identical 
to the Federal Rule, Ohio's Rule 403 is rarely applied to scientific evidence because the 
result usually ends in summary judgment for the defendant. See Margaret A. Burger, 
Evidentiary Framework, in THE REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 37, 113-116 
(Federal Judicial Centered., 1994). 
59Giannelli, supra note 52, at 1250 (concluding that the relevance/reliability 
screening process of complex scientific principles leads to the admission of 
"insufficiently valid data techniques" and, thus, an inappropriate test for the 
admissibility of scientific evidence). 
60Kesan, supra note 52, at 1994. 
61Jd. at 1995 (citing Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After 
Daubert: The "Prestige" Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867,884 n.44 (1994). 
62See OHIO Evro. R. 706. "Learned Treatises for Impeachment." Id. Rule 706 permits 
the impeachment of expert witnesses through the use of publications not only relied 
upon by the expert but determined as authoritative by other expert testimony or by 
judicial notice. Id.; see discussion infra Section IV.A. 
630aubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged 
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reached similar conclusions.64 The court upheld the admission of DNA 
evidence but limited the application of the relevance/reliability standard to 
novel or new scientific theories.65 After reviewing literature on the validity of 
DNA typing, the court expressed its belief that DNA testing had risen to the 
level of a generally recognized test. 66 Quoting a passage signaling a progressive 
approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence, the court endorsed the 
language of one commentator, saying that all expert testimony based on 
generally recognized tests was presumptively admissible.67 The term 
than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended. Indeed, 
theories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of 
scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are subject 
to judicial notice under Fed. Rule Evid. 201. 
Id. at 592 n.ll. While being mindful of the above dicta, note that federal courts often 
refuse to apply Daubert when faced with engineers alleging defects in products liability 
cases relying upon general engineeringprinciples,-i.e., math and physics-rather than 
new or unconventional methodologies. See, e.g., Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 
82 F.3d 1513 (lOth Cir. 1996) (finding Daubert inapplicable to an engineer's testimony 
on crashworthiness); Officer v. Teledyne Republic/Spray, 870 F. Supp. 408 (D. Mass. 
1994) (refusing to apply a Daubert analysis to assess the reliability of an engineer's 
testimony on the defective design of a hydraulic jack); Tassin v. Sears Roebuck Co., 946 
F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. La. 1996) (Daubert factors are irrelevant to a case involving 
alternative product designs); Lisa M. Agrimonti, The Limitations of Daubert and Its 
Misapplication to Quasi-Scientific Experts, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 134 (1995) (making a case 
that engineers are quasi-scientific experts because their methodology consists of basic 
principles of math, physics and engineering typically learned by engineers during their 
training);Cf, Cummins v. Lyle Industries, 93 F.3d362 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying a Daubert 
analysis to an engineer's opinion that was based on generally accepted-though not 
proffered-engineering principles); FRANCIS H. HARE & ALLWIN E. HORN, EXPERT 
OPINION TESTIMONY-THE DAUBERT ANALYSIS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO ESTABLISHED 
PRINCIPLES OF SciENCE (Indep. Counsel Resources Monograph Series 011, 1997). 
64State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107, 115 (Ohio 1992). Writing for a unanimous court, 
Judge Moyer reaffirmed the relevancy standard for the admission of scientific evidence 
and firmly rejected the defendant's request that the court adopt the Frye test for the 
admissibility of DNA evidence. Id. 
65Pierce, 597 N.E.2d at 107. After the amendment of Rule 702 of the Ohio Rules of 
Evidence, trial judges must apply the relevance/reliability standard to the foundations 
of any expert's opinion, even where an expert opinion is based on generally recognized 
tests-an instance warranting the mere formality of judicial notice. See OHIO EviD. R. 
702. 
66Pierce, 597 N.E.2d at 112. "Although irrelevant for the determination of 
admissibility under Ohio law, the theory and procedures used in DNA typing are 
generally accepted within the scientific community." Id. 
67 See id. (quoting Note, United States v. Two Bulls: Eighth Circuit Addresses Admissibility 
of Forensic DNA Evidence, 37 LoY. L. REv. 173, 177 (1991)). 
The relevancy standard balances the probativeness, materiality, and 
reliability of the evidence against the risk of misleading or confusing 
the jury or unfairly prejudicing the defendant. This approach makes 
all expert testimony on generally recognized tests presumptively ad-
missible and places the burden of excluding the evidence on the 
opponent. 
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"presumptively admissible" in this context may be misleading. A review of the 
citations supporting this statement discloses that state and federal courts take 
judicial notice of scientific evidence generally accepted within the scientific 
community rather than presume admissibility.68 
Rule 702 now requires information forming the basis of expert opinion to 
undergo a "reliability determination." Although Rule 702 supersedes Pierce,69 
the case recognized judicial notice as a time-saving procedure to eliminate 
unnecessary hearings over undisputed methodology. After Pierce, a court, in 
its discretion, may take judicial notice of the reliability of all generally accepted 
tests. 
3. State v. Bresson-Soft Science 
Although Daubert explicitly applied its analysis to conclusions derived from 
scientific knowledge, a number of legal commentators prior to Kumho question 
whether Daubert applies to non-scientific testimony?O In contrast to opinions 
based on science, opinions based on specialized knowledge, skill, or training 
lack the scientific foundations that can be empirically tested.71 Arguably, the 
relevance/reliability approach is better suited to the determination of 
reliability of expert opinions drawn from personal experience and specialized 
knowledge. 
Id. (citing State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253,259 (W.Va. 1989)). 
68The Woodall court applied the relevancy standard, stating "Rule 702 [of the West 
Virginia Rules of Evidence] makes all expert testimony concerning generally recognized 
tests presumptively admissible and casts the burden of excluding such testimony upon 
the side seeking exclusion." Woodall,385 S.E.2d at 259. The court also stated, "[a]s to DNA 
typing analysis, we find that the reliability of these tests is now generally accepted by 
geneticists, biochemists, and the like. Thus, no Frye hearing will be required in the future 
for judicial notice of reliability." Id. at 260 (citation omitted). 
69See State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1338 (Ohio 1998). "Since Pierce, ... Evid.R. 
702 [sic] was amended, specifically adding the requirement that the information 
forming the basis of the expert testimony be 'reliable."' I d. 
70See Burger, supra note 58, at 84-88, for discussion regarding the well argued debate 
over whether the stringency of empirical validation is appropriate to methodology 
which lacks a close resemblance to the traditions of the scientific method. See also 
Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. 
L. REv. 1481 (1995). This article suggests the application of the same standard of 
reliability for all types of expert testimony by applying maximum flexibility rather than 
a rigid set of criteria. Id. at 1527. 
71See Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 
supra note 70, at 1525 n.133 (citing John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social 
Science Research After Daubert, 2 5HEPARDS EXPERT & SCI. EVIDENCE Q. 327, 332 (1994)). 
Monahan and Walker propose a more relaxed standard for evaluating the reliability of 
social science research. Id. 
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In State v. Bresson,72 a case that dealt with "soft science,"73 the Supreme court 
of Ohio reversed the Franklin County Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial 
court's judgement convicting the defendant of driving under the influence of 
alcohol?4 On appeal to the supreme court, the Franklin County Court of 
Appeals certified the following question: "Whether a court may admit evidence 
of a defendant's performance on a horizontal gaze nystagmus test in the 
absence of expert testimony establishing the scientific foundation of the test."75 
The Bresson court declined to characterize the HGN test as scientific in nature, 
thereby negating the need for an expert witness to lay a scientific foundation 
for the validity of the test?6 Ultimately the court held, 
[a] properly qualified officer may testify at trial regarding a driver's 
performance on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test as it pertains to the 
issues of probable cause to arrest and whether the driver was operating 
a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol .... However, such 
testimony may not be admitted to show what the exact alcohol 
concentration level of the driver was for ~urposes of demonstrating a 
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2), (3), or (4). 7 
Bresson illustrates the analysis favored by the Ohio Supreme Court when 
dealing with tests and procedures incapable of validation through an empirical 
process. First, consistent with the relevance/reliability approach, the court 
conducted only a preliminary review focusing on corroborative findings of 
probity and accuracy of the test?B Second, the court examined medical journals 
for some evidence verifying the accuracy of the HGN test?9 Thus, the court 
applied the relevance/reliability standard to non-scientific evidence and took 
72State v. Bresson, 554 N.E.2d 1330 (Ohio 1990). 
73for an explanation of the difference between hard and soft science see Cathleen C. 
Herasimchuk, A Practical Guide to the Admissibility of Novel Expert Evidence in Criminal 
Trials Under Federal Rule 702, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 181, 194 (1990). "The types of novel 
expertise currently offered in courts run the gamut from the highly subjective, 'soft' 
sciences of psychology and psychiatry to the highly objective 'hard' sciences of 
microbiology, chemistry, and nuclear physics." Id. 
74Bresson, 554 N.E.2d at 1331. 
75 Id. at 1332. 
76Jd. at 1335. The HGN test was admissible after an initial showing of the officer's 
qualifications and that proper techniques were performed. 
77Jd. at 1330-31 (syllabus). 
78Jd. at 1332-34. 
79 Bresson, 554 N.E.2d at 1332-34. The court appears to take judicial notice of medical 
literature to establish reliability. Typically, the Ohio Supreme Court has looked to 
learned treatises to find reasonable assurances that the methodology in question has 
been subject to favorable peer review. See, e.g., Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687 N.E.2d 
735 (Ohio 1998); and Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d at 1332. 
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judicial notice of learned treatises establishing the validity of the expert's 
methodology. 80 
4. Miller v. Bike Athletic Co.-Limitations of Relevance/Reliability Approach 
Miller v. Bike Athletic Co.81 underscores the difficulty of assimilating Daubert 
into a jurisdiction that applies the balancing process of the relevance/ reliability 
standard to screen all types of expert opinion. In Miller, the court held that "a 
trial court's role in determining whether an expert's testimony is admissible 
under Evid. R. 702 focuses on whether the opinion is based upon scientifically 
valid principles, not whether the expert's conclusions are correct or whether 
the testimony satisfies the proponent's burden of proof at trial."82 The majority 
opinion ruled that the lower court abused its discretion when it excluded expert 
testimony that a properly inflated football helmet liner would have prevented 
a neck fracture and permanent paralysis in a high school football player.83 In 
Miller, the expert relied on an outdated theory and formed an opinion that 
ignored a large base of medicalliterature84 showing the true culprit behind 
severe spinal injuries to be hyperflexion of the neck and axial loading-the 
transmission of forces from the skull to the spinal cord and supporting 
vertebrae-initiated by striking an opponent with the crown of the helmet.85 
A well-fitting, defect-free helmet protects against head injuries but affords 
80With respect to taking judicial notice, the Bresson court's conduct is consistent with 
commentary under Rule 706 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence. "The common law rule 
restricted the use of a learned treatise to impeachment .... A possible expansion of the 
common law rule concerns the use of judicial notice to establish the treatise as a reliable 
authority. A court taking judicial notice of Gray's Anatomy illustrates this aspect of the 
rule." OHIO Evm. R. 706 staff note (citation omitted). 
81 Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687 N.E.2d 735 (1998). 
82Id. at 736 (syllabus). 
83 Id. at 738. Plaintiff, a high school football player, was rendered quadriplegic while 
attempting to tackle another player running at him full speed. Plaintiff's expert, a 
mechanical and biomedical engineer, examined the helmet and found that the 
energy-absorbing liner that protected the top of the head had not been properly inflated 
at the time of Plaintiff's injury. Plaintiff's expert opined that proper inflation would have 
sufficiently absorbed the force of impact and avoided a fracture of the fifth cervical 
vertebrae. Id. 
84See, e.g., Note, Injuries Resulting from Nonintentional Acts in Organized Contact Sports: 
The Theories of Recovery Available to the Injured Athlete, 12lNo. L. REv. 687 (1979); Philo & 
Stine, The Liability Path to Safer Helmets, TRIAL 38 Oan. 1977); Practical Trial Suggestions: 
Products Liability of Sports Equipment Suppliers, 28 DEF. L.J. 332 (1979). 
85See Gerald J. Todaro, Allocation of Risk Based on Mechanics of Injury in Sports: A 
Proposed Presumption ofNon-Fault, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 33 (1987) (discussing 
the development of rule changes on the use of a helmet to intentionally butt, ram, spear 
or strike an opponent with the crown or top of the helmet resulting from medical 
research establishing that the compression effect from the force of the impact can result 
in fractures of the vertebrae). 
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minimal protection from neck fractures and spinal injuries.86 The plaintiff's 
expert in Miller relied upon an antiquated theory that had lost credence in 
sports medicine.87 However, the majority admitted the expert's opinion 
because the testimony could aid the trier of fact.88 
The majority apparently applied the reliability factors found in Daubert to 
determine a minimal level of reliability for the basis of the expert's opinion. Yet, 
without articulating the relevance/reliability approach, the majority ruled that 
Plaintiff's out of court experiments testing the helmet were sufficiently reliable 
to aid the trier of fact.89 Endorsing Daubert, the dissent strongly recommended 
a gatekeeping role for Ohio trial judges, especially where the basis of the 
testimony ought to comply with Rules 702(C)(l), (2), and (3) of the Ohio Rules 
of Evidence.90 
Unfortunately, the majority in Miller relied upon Joiner as decided by the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.91 The Eleventh Circuit decision limited its 
focus to whether an expert's opinions were based on scientifically valid 
principles, not the conclusions and opinions drawn from tests, methodology, 
and principles.92 As stated above, it was later overturned by the United States 
Supreme Court.93 
Whether an expert's theory is innovative or controversial, reliability is 
compromised when numerous medical or scientific studies compel a 
conclusion contrary to the one advanced by the expert. Applying a Joiner 
analysis (as exercised by the United States Supreme Court) to the facts in Miller, 
the expert's opinion, contradicted by a virtual consensus of medical and scienti-
86See Todaro, supra note 85, n.l9-25. 
87See id. 
88 How helpful is testimony contrary to the prevailing view founded on medical and 
scientific research? See discussion infra Section IV.B, suggesting that one expert opposing 
another-out of the context of the complete framework of medical literature--permits 
a the jury to mistakenly believe that a legitimate schism exists in a given medical field. 
89 Miller, 687 N.E.2d at 742. "Dr. Lafferty's theory is not so complicated that it would 
overwhelm a jury. We find that his testimony could aid the trier of fact in determining 
whether the football helmet was a cause of injury to appellant's neck." Id. The Miller 
court's conclusion is confusing. The majority seems to apply Rule 702 in its unamended 
form while applying Daubert which provided the impetus for the amendment. See OI-Iro 
Evro. R. 702 staff note (explaining the rationale for eliminating the "aid the trier of fact" 
language). 
90Miller, 687 N.E.2d at 744 (1998) (Cooke, J., dissenting). 
91Jd. (citing Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524,530 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
92See Jpiner, 78 F.3d at 530. 
93 By reversing the Eleventh circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court established 
that reliability determinations may include a review of the expert's calculations and 
ultimate conclusions. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 512. 
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fie research,94 arguably lacks sufficient reliability to aid the trier of fact.95 
Consequently, Miller is at odds with recent federal case law, and thus it leaves 
unsettled the depth of the trial court's investigation into the reliability element 
of the relevance/ reliability standard. 
Assuming Ohio's continued dedication to the relevance/ reliability standard 
and its deference to the jury's determination of reliability, jurors will need more 
access to learned treatises to gain greater perspective on an expert's opinion. 
Courtroom availability of medical and scientific literature seems necessary to 
prevent jurors' "uncritical acceptance" of expert opinions that defy prevailing 
views in medicine or science.96 
5. State v. Nemeth--Ohio Judges' Limited Gatekeeping Role 
The recent decision of State v. Nemeth97 endorsed a preliminary judicial 
determination of the reliability of expert opinions. However, the decision 
ultimately continues the relaxed standard imposed by the relevance/ reliability 
approach: "Courts should favor the admissibility of expert testimony whenever 
it is relevant and the criteria of Evid. R. 702 [sic] are met."98 
In State v. Nemeth, Defendant, a 16 year old boy, was tried for killing his 
alcoholic and abusive mother by shooting her five times in the head and neck 
with a compound bow and arrow.99 The trial court had excluded the testimony 
of a Ph.D. psychologist on the "battered child syndrome" proffered by 
Defendant to support his claim of self-defense or justification for the instruction 
on the lesser included defense of murder.lOO Although faced with an expert 
whose methodology was less exacting than a medical doctor, the supreme court 
reviewed and cited learned treatises to validate the principles underlying the 
psychologist's opinion of a defendant suffering from battered child syndrome. 
In one sentence, the Supreme Court provided the clearest definition of 
94Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 
MINN. L. REv. 1387, 1412-1417 (1994). Sanders notes that, in Bendectin cases, the courts 
often excluded opinions based on in vitro and in vivo studies because of the 
overwhelming body of contradictory epidemiological evidence. Id. at 1413-1414 
nn.144-47. 
95Jd. at 1438 (citing Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of 
Science, 32 ]URIMETRICS J. 345, 347-348). See also Charles J. Walsh & Beth S. Rose, Increasing 
the Useful Information Provided by Experts in the Courtroom: A Comparison of Federal Rules 
of Evidence 703 and 803(18) with the Evidence Rules in Illinois, Ohio and New York, 26 SETON 
HALL L. REv. 183 (1995) (concluding that the failure to adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(18) governing the admission of learned treatises prevents the maximum receipt of 
information to jurors). 
96Sanders, supra note 94, at 1438. 
97State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332 (Ohio 1998). 
98Jd. at 1336. 
99Jd. 
100 Id. at 1334. 
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reliability currently available: "Relevant evidence based on valid principles will 
satisfy the threshold reliability standard for the admission of expert 
testimony."101 The remaining paragraph places the judge's preliminary role as 
a gatekeeper in perspective: 
The credibility to be afforded these principles in the expert's 
conclusions remain a matter for the trier of fact. The reliability 
requirement in Evid. R. 702 is a threshold determination that should 
focus on a particular type of scientific evidence, not the truth or falsity 
of an alleged scientific fact or truth. 'In other words, the Court need 
not make the initial determination that the expert testimony or the 
evidence proffered is true before submitting the information to the 
jury.'102 
Nemeth articulates the evidentiary framework by which Ohio judges 
determine the admissibility of scientific evidence under Rule 702 of the Ohio 
Rules of Evidence. First, under Rule 401 of the Ohio Rules, the evidence must 
be relevant)03 Second, pursuant to amended Rule 702: the testimony must 
relate to a matter beyond the knowledge or experience of a layperson;l04 the 
witness must be qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, 
experience, training or education; lOS and the witness' testimony must be based 
on reliable scientific, technical or other specialized information.l06 Lastly, the 
court must determine if the probative value of the expert's opinion is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion or 
undue delay in accordance with Rule 403 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence)07 
In contrast to the federal system, Ohio's evidentiary framework precludes 
judges from plumbing the depths of an expert's analytical arguments to 
determine if any gap exists between principles and courtroom conclusions. Nor 
is the judge called upon to consider the truth or falsity of the conclusions 
rendered by the expert. Nemeth draws a fine line between principles and 
conclusions-identical to the line penciled-in by Daubert. But Nemeth stiffens 
101Jd. at 1339. 
102Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d at 1339 (citations omitted). 
103 Id. at 1336 (noting the requirement under Rule 401 that evidence is relevant if it has 
"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."). See also infra text accompanying note 107. 
l04See Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d at 1336 (quoting OHIO Evro. R. 702). 
l05See id. (quoting OHIO EVID. R. 702). 
106Jd. 
107Though not specifically mentioned by the Nemeth court, Rule 403, defining an 
aspect of relevancy, functions as a companion to the relevancy analysis applied under 
Rule 401. This requirement is inferred from the supreme court's caveat that "[c]ourts 
should favor the admissibility of expert testimony whenever it is relevant." Nemeth, 694 
N.E.2d at 1336. 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss2/8
1998] ADMISSIBILITY OF MEDICAL TESTIMONY IN OHIO 337 
the flexibility of the relevance/reliability approach by providing the trial judge 
a limited gatekeeper role. How long will Ohio judges resist the temptation to 
analyze the rationale of experts they dislike? If Joiner is any indication of judicial 
restraint, Ohio judges may soon emulate federal judges and seek to examine 
the validity not only of methods and principles but the logic underlying the 
expert's reasoning process. 
Ill. ADMISSION OF PHYSICIAN TESTIMONY UNDER THE 
RELEVANCE/RELIABILITY STANDARD 
Under rule 702 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence and the relevance/reliability 
standard, no longer may judges admit physician testimony solely on the basis 
of the physician's education, training, and medical licensure. Consequently, 
courts should now make preliminary reliability assessments of an expert's 
opinions in the courtroom, in addition to the usual predicates of admissibility 
under the Ohio Rules of Evidence. Courts should take judicial notice of the 
reliability of the long established practice, known as differential diagnosis, 
except for the unusual circumstance where no support is found in medical 
training, research, or epidemiology studies for a physician's opinion on the 
issue of causation. 
Historically, Ohio courts have seldom questioned the physician's 
methodology underlying diagnosis and treatment or, more importantly, the 
forensic opinions derived from a treating physician's management of a patient. 
Indeed, a state medical license and an active practice qualifies the physician to 
render a series of medical opinions about the patient's condition, necessary 
treatment, and future medical care.l08 
As seen in this section, the medical reasoning process consists of the 
systematic accumulation of patient information, medical research, and medical 
literature. Physicians use methodology on a daily basis to form medical 
conclusions in the practice of medicine. Daubert and Joiner changed the 
lOB See, e.g., Ishler v. Miller, 384 N.E.2d 296 (Ohio 1978) (rejecting the contention that 
an expert in a medical malpractice case must be board certified in the same specialty as 
the defendant doctor); see also Rouse v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 459 N.E.2d 593 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a physician licensed to practice medicine is competent to 
testify on medical issues, including the causal relationship of medical expenses to a 
particular injury). Evidence that a physician practices in a different specialty of medicine 
has a bearing on the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility. Id. 
For example, a cardiologist or an internist may testify about a family practice 
physician's mismanagement of a patient's unstable angina, but an orthopedist, although 
duly licensed, would likely lack the requisite qualifications. See Alexander v. Mount 
Carmel Med. Ctr., 383 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio 1978) (finding podiatrist competent to testify 
against an orthopedic surgeon on the issue of proper casting of a fracture); Steel v. 
Buxton 639 N.E.2d 861(0hio Ct. App. 1994) (holding that general practitioner serving 
as a surgical assistant was competent to testify because of overlapping specialties). 
The exception involves standard-of-care issues in medical malpractice cases. 
Physicians who devote less than one-half of their time to the active clinical practice of 
medicine lack the qualifications to give competent expert testimony. See OHIO Evm. R. 
601(D). The Federal Rules of Evidence lack a similar competency requirement. 
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emphasis on the evidentiary foundations of opinions forged by medical 
experts. Similarly, Rule 702 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence and the 
relevance/reliability standard requires the witness to produce not only a valid 
medical license but methodology, as well. Clearly, as seen in this section, courts 
should take judicial notice of the long-established clinical practice of 
differential diagnosis. Especially on complex issues of medical causation, 
differential diagnosis provides a reliable method upon which to base the 
physician's opinion on causation and damages. 
A. The Methodology of Diagnosis 
Today technology-in the form of diagnostic studies, quantitative clinical 
reasoning, and statistically validated treatment outcomes-attests to the role 
of science in the practice of medicine.l09 Medical opinions fit somewhere 
between the 'soft' and 'hard' sciences.llO Physicians rarely reach a definitive 
diagnosis without first interpreting data generated from sophisticated medical 
technology.111 More than ever, clinical decisions are supported by data, 
109Thomas A. Lang & Michael Secic, How to Report Statistics in Medicine, in AMERICAN 
COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS 147, 147-169, (1996). The role of technology in the form of 
diagnostic testing is so essential to diagnosis that guidelines for reporting characteristics 
of new tests have been established to help physicians evaluate their validity. Id. 
110In the introductory chapter of Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, the editors 
articulate the relationship between art and science: 
Science-based technology is the foundation for the solution to many 
clinical problems; the dazzling advances in biochemical methodology 
and in biophysical imaging techniques that allow access to the remotest 
recesses of the body are the products of science .... Yet skill in the most 
sophisticated application of laboratory technology and in the use of the 
latest therapeutic modality alone does not make a good physician. The 
ability to extract from a mass of contradictory physical signs and the 
crowded computer printouts of laboratory data those items that are of 
crucial significance, to know in a difficult case where to treat 'or to 
watch,' to determine when a clinical clue is worth pursuing or when to 
dismiss it as a 'red herring,' and estimate in any given patient whether 
a proposed treatment entails a greater risk than the disease are all in-
volved in the decisions that the clinician, skilled in the practice of med-
icine, must make many times each day. 
ANTHONY S. FAUCI eta!., HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1 (McGraw Hill 
14th ed. 1998). 
lllHarrison's Principles of Internal Medicine defines the concept of evidence-based 
medicine as clinical decisions formally supported by data, especially data from 
randomized, controlled clinical trials. See FAUCI supra note 110. The text cites a 1995 study 
concluding that 82% of primary treatments administered at a university-affiliated 
hospital had previously been scientifically validated by randomized controlled clinical 
trials or by unanimous agreement that such studies were unnecessary. FAUCI supra note 
110, at 4. See also R.O. BRANDENBURG ET AL., CARDIOLOGY FUNDAMENTALS AND PRACTICE, 
33 (Yearbook Med. Publishers, Inc. 1997) (tracing the evolution of cardiac 
instrumentation resulting in more precise information leading to increased accuracy of 
diagnosis). 
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particularly data derived from controlled clinical trials reported in medical 
journals. 
The cognitive model of making medical decisions is a five-step process: 1) 
investigation of the complaint by means of clinical examination (history and 
physical examination); 2) ordering of diagnostic tests, each with its own 
intrinsic accuracy and usefulness; 3) integration of clinical findings with test 
results to assess diagnostic probabilities; 4) weighing of comparative risks and 
benefits of alternative courses of action; and 5) determination of patient's 
preferences and development of a therapeutic plan.112 
As soon as a doctor performs an examination on a patient, differential 
diagnosis provides the means by which physicians reach a conclusion on a 
patient's illness or disease. The process of prioritizing the causes of a patient's 
signs and symptoms and treating the most likely cause of the patient's illness 
describes the operation of differential diagnosis.l13 Once the patient's malady 
is identified, treatment begins. In the process of clinical reasoning, physicians 
systematically formulate medical opinions and select treatment altematives.114 
Thus the clinical practice of medicine necessarily depends on technology, 
medical research, and differential diagnosis. 
Daubert and its followers rarely quibble with a physician's diagnosis. The 
skirmish line is drawn where the physician relies on differential diagnosis to 
causally connect the medical condition of a patient to a product or chemical 
substance. In Joiner, for example, one of the experts, a medical toxicologist, 
testified at trial that he formed his opinion through the process of differential 
diagnosis. liS Despite the expert's reliance on differential diagnosis, the trial 
court rejected the expert's opinion on causation, and the Joiner Court ultimately 
ll2See FAUCI supra note 110, at 9 (noting the five phases of clinical reasoning in Table 
3-1). 
113Bemard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in THE 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SciENTIFIC EVIDENCE 181, 214 (Federal Judicial Center ed., 1994 ). 
Technically, differential diagnosis is a process of elimination, forcing physicians 
evaluating chest pain, for example, to think about diagnosis in the following fashion: 
"Dx [diagnosis] myocardial infarct R/0 (rule out) pulmonary embolus and aortic 
dissection." Differential diagnosis is defined as a method by which a physician 
determines what disease process has caused a patient's symptoms. Id. The physician 
considers all relevant potential causes of the symptoms and then eliminates alternative 
causes based on physical examination, clinical tests and a thorough case history. Id. 
114Diagnosis and medical treatment of a patient's condition almost always depends 
on diagnostic testing. The clinical management of patients combines the education and 
training of a physician with a battery oflaboratory studies, x-rays, and invasive imagery. 
Essentially, science provides the data, but the physician must interpret the data. Similar 
to lawyers, physicians cannot afford the luxury of certainty that drives the scientist in 
the laboratory. Although science and technology provide a sound basis for the treatment 
of a patient, good clinical decision making is a skill not solely dependent on science or 
art. In short, technology has yet to replace judgment. See generally FAUCI supra note 110. 
115 Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 522 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
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found that the trial court's decision was not an abuse of discretion.116 However, 
Joiner left unresolved a split in the lower courts over the admission of causation 
opinions on the basis of differential diagnosis.117 
Differential diagnosis remains a valid method of reaching causation 
opinions, unless the epidemiology studies, lab studies, and medical literature 
providing the data to support the expert's opinion is deemed unreliable. In 
short, Joiner's concern over "analytical gaps" translates into a problem well 
known to trial lawyers: Insufficient facts fail to support an expert's conclusion. 
After Daubert and Joiner, at least in the federal court system, what used to be a 
question of weight is now solely a question of admissibility. 
B. Medical Research and Epidemiology 
Epidemiology is the study of the incidence, distribution, and etiology of 
disease in human populations,l18 Epidemiologists make the assumption that 
disease is not distributed randomly within groups of people.l19 
Epidemiological evidence comes into play in the courtroom when people 
exposed to an agent or chemical are compared to an unexposed group and the 
results show that the exposed group contracted a particular illness or disease 
more readily than others. Through a comparison of the exposed population 
group to the unexposed group, epidemiologists draw conclusions to establish 
relationships between exposure to an agent and a particular illness. From a 
litigation standpoint, the problem arises when experts use epidemiological 
findings as a basis to infer a causal connection between a chemical (or drug) 
and the plaintiff's injury,l20 
116 Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 523. 
117For circuit opinions holding that a clinical physician may express an opinion based 
on clinical medical methodology that a toxic substance caused the patient's disease, see 
Moore v. Ashland Chern., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998). Moore sheds light on the 
enormous discretion involved in the admissibility of clinical physicians' opinion on 
causation. The majority opinion excluded the testimony of a non-treating physician 
relying on differential diagnosis, yet it found the testimony of the treating physician 
reliable, even though he relied on essentially the same scientific information. Id. For 
additional cases excluding physician testimony, see Schmaltz v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 896 
F. Supp.180 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756 (C.D. Va.1995),affd 
in part and rev'd in part 100 F.3d 11, 50 (4th Cir. 1996); O'Connor v. Commonwealth 
Edison, 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994). For decisions 
finding opinions based on clinical methodology unsupported by hard science, see 
Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998); Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 
66 F.3d 1378 (4th Cir. 1995); Hose v. Chicago Northwestern Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968 (8th 
Cir. 1995). 
118Linda A. Bailey, et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in THE REFERENCE MANUAL 
ON SciENTIFIC EVIDENCE 121, 125 (Federal Judicial Centered., 1994). 
l19Jd. 
120Bert Black & Patrick W. Lee, Guide to Epidemiology in Statistics, in EXPERT EVIDENCE, 
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 77-78 (West Group 1997). 
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In all medical fields only well controlled clinical trials truly measure the 
value of new treatment modalities.121 Clinical trials are medical experiments 
designed to reach scientific conclusions.122 However, the validity of the 
inferences drawn from clinical studies depends on the scientific model. 
Statisticians recognize three classes of scientific study in a descending order of 
validity: experiments, quasi-experiments, and observational studies.123 As the 
research travels down this continuum, the level of uncertainty increases, due 
to the lack of control over potential variables unaccounted for in the study.124 
The results of randomized clinical trials presents the best evidence of 
improvements in the treatment of illness and disease. A randomized clinical 
trial consists of a treatment group and a control group, in which subjects are 
randomly selected and assigned to each group.l25 The control group is not 
treated. If the two groups have very similar characteristics, a difference in 
response is probably a result of the treatment.126 However, if the treatment 
group differs from the control group by one or more factors, "the effects of the 
factors are likely to be "confounded" with the effects of the treatment."127 In 
cancer research, anything less than a randomized, well controlled clinical trial 
offers a weak basis for causal inferences about effective treatment.128 
l2lSee FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 3, 4-6 (3d ed. 1998). The authors provide an 
excellent description of a randomized clinical trial involving the effectiveness of the Salk 
vaccine: 
A new drug is introduced. How should an experiment be designed to 
test its effectiveness? The basic method is comparison. The drug is given 
to subjects in a treatment group, but other subjects are used as controls-
they are not treated. Then the responses of the two groups are compared. 
Subjects should be assigned to treatment or control at random, and the 
experiment should be run double-blind: Neither the subjects nor the 
doctors who measure the response should know who was in the treat-
ment group and who was in the control group. 
Id. at 3-9. 
l22See id. 
l23See Stephen E. Fienberg et al., Understanding and Evaluating Statistical Evidence in 
Litigation, 36 ]URIMETRICS J. 1 (1995). 
l24See id. (elaborating on some of the more common misunderstandings in statistical 
reasoning). 
l25fREEDMAN ET AL., supra note 121, at 1-11. 
126 Id. at 11. 
l27Jd. (emphasis added). 
1281 VINCENT T. DEVITA ET AL., CANCER: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF ONCOLOGY 3, at 
513 (5th ed. 1997) (quoting B. MAcMAHAN & T.F. PUGH, EPIDEMIOLOGY: PRINCIPLES AND 
METHODS (1970) for the proposition that statistical associations from observational 
studies are often not dependable). 
Only a minority of statistical associations are causal .... Once a statis-
tical association has been demonstrated, how can it be determined 
whether or not it is causal .... The most satisfactory procedure is a 
direct experiment .... The evaluation of the causal nature of a rela-
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Controlled clinical trials that lack randomization constitute 
quasi-experiments,129 because the investigator controls which subjects receive 
treatment. Whenever the judgment of the medical investigator enters into the 
process of patient selection for either the true treatment or control group, the 
loss of randomization destroys the true experimental status of a clinical trial.130 
For example, a surgeon selecting patients eligible for a study of a new surgical 
technique may exclude sicker or older patients. This leads to "confounding," 
meaning a hidden factor caused the difference seen in patient response to 
treatment.131 Surprisingly, a good number of published studies of medical 
research fit into the category of non-randomized controlled trials. 
Observational studies provide the least valid inference between treatment 
and improvement of patient outcomes. For example, by considering factors 
common to a group of cancer patients (such as tumor grade, stage, age and sex), 
a clinician may retrospectively compare the survival rate of those patients who 
underwent cancer radiation treatment and those who underwent 
chemotherapy.132 The list of cancer patients in an observational study may be 
compiled from a tumor registry or a database tracking patient outcomes.133 
Since the investigator did not control which patients received radiation 
treatment, nor the makeup of patients treated with chemotherapy, the 
investigator lacked control over confounding factors. 
Although randomized clinical trials far outweigh the evidentiary value of 
observational studies, the former are rarely done because of ethical and 
practical restrictions.l34 Consequently, observational studies provide the bulk 
of articles appearing in medical literature. Statisticians warn that observational 
studies establish only associations, not causal relationships.135 Because 
I d. 
tionship, in the absence of direct experiment, is neither easy nor objec-
tive .... The field of cancer therapy is replete with examples of new 
modalities that were taken up with enthusiasm and proved worth-
less only after they had resulted in many years of futile cost and 
suffering. 
129fienberg et al., supra note 123, at 15. 
l30[d. 
131 FREEDMAN ET AL., supra note 121, at 20. Observational studies are the usual vehicle 
for the study of the causes of cancer. ld. However, in terms of contributing to the 
treatment of future cancer patients, observational studies are poor substitutes for 
prospective clinical trials. See DEVITA ET AL., supra note 128, at 513. 
132DEVITA ET AL., supra note 128, at 513 (devoting an entire chapter on the design and 
analysis of clinical trials because randomized clinical trials are the true vehicle of 
advancing new treatments). 
133Jd. at 231. 
134Id. at 234. 
135fREEDMAN ET AL., supra note 121, at 27. "Observational studies can establish 
association: one thing is linked to another. Association may point to causation: if 
exposure causes disease, then people who are exposed should be sicker than similar 
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scientists respond cautiously to findings reported in observational studies, 
causal inferences drawn from such studies are controversial. However, a 
consensus of observational studies reporting similar findings may furnish 
compelling evidence. For example, the enormous evidence linking tobacco use 
to lung cancer comes from observational studies dating back to the 1950s)36 
As the number of observational studies increased, so did the strength of the 
evidence identifying smoking as a cause of lung cancer. 
1. Medical Literature-Publishing Medical Research and 
Reporting Statistical Significance 
This section explores the basic concepts represented by the numerical values 
which appear in medical and scientific literature)37 Statistical calculations 
affect the physician's evaluation of whether the conclusions contained in 
medical and scientific research are valid. Like the physician, lawyers and 
judges concerned about reliability should appreciate that statistical 
significance does not mean "statistically important." Rather, "significance" 
signifies a numerical value.l38 In statistics, mathematical formulas yield precise 
numerical information that lawyers and judges all too frequently 
overgeneralize to satisfy burdens of proof)39 Because statistical reasoning is 
often presented in a counter-intuitive manner, the concept of random variation, 
essential to understanding statistics, eludes most lawyers. 
people who are not exposed. But association does not scientifically prove causation." I d. 
136DEVITA ET AL., supra note 128, at 158. The authors state that the epidemiological 
data on smoking and lung cancer meets the criteria for establishing causal association 
in an observational study, i.e., "the consistency of the results across studies, the strength 
of the relationship [relative risk ratio], its specificity, the correct temporal sequence 
between exposure and disease, and the coherence of the association as evidenced by 
dose-response relation." Id. (citation omitted). 
1371 would like to express my gratitude to Professor Panickos Palettas from the 
Department of Statistics at Ohio State University for his helpful comments on statistical 
reasoning. Any errors in the translation of statistical concepts are my own. 
138DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF 
STATISTICS, 454 (2d ed. 1993). Notice, the majority in Joiner appears to use the term 
"statistically significant" to mean "statistically important" in discussing the scientific 
articles supporting the plaintiff's theory of causation. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 519. 
139 A warning about the nature of statistical reasoning seems appropriate here. The 
argument that trial lawyers and judges should understand statistics well enough to 
reason like statisticians is analogous to asking an English teacher to read the Bill of Rights 
and then argue a First Amendment case before an appellate court. See Fienberg et al., 
supra note 123, at 18 (offering a discussion on statistical confusion between probability 
of sample identification and probability of guilt, referred to as "the fallacy of the 
transposed conditional"). 
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a. P Value 
To medical researchers, the design of a clinical trial or study evaluating the 
benefits of a new treatment carries more weight than statistical significance. 
Since clinical trials are the principal vehicle of medical research, the medical 
community demands an assurance that treatment effects reported in a clinical 
trial were not due to chance.l40 Statisticians use a "test of significance" (a 
probability value commonly shown asP-value) to calculate the possibilities that 
the treatment result is a chance occurrence.l41 Statisticians have universally 
decided that a significance level limiting a chance occurrence to 5% or less 
means the results of the study have achieved "statistical significance."142 For 
example, a P-value of 5% or less (P~.OS) means that patient improvement 
observed in the study could not happen by chance except in 5 (or less) of 100 
similar studies. 
Even with a P~.OS, statisticians caution against inferring too much from 
statistical significance.l43 This warning is predicated on a reverse logic not 
easily discernible by non-statisticians.l44 In his introductory text, Statistics: 
Concepts and Controversies, David Moore describes this unusual twist of 
statistical reasoning: 
A statistical test begins by supposing for the sake of argument that the 
effect we see is not present. We then look for evidence against this 
supposition and in favor of the effect we hope to find. The first step in 
a test of significance is to state a claim that we will try to find evidence 
against ... a statement being tested in a test of significance, [it's] called 
the null hypothesis. The test of significance is designed to assess the 
strength of the evidence against the null hypothesis .... Usually the 
null hypothesis is a statement of "no effect" or "no difference."145 
140DEVITA ET AL., supra note 128, at 234. 
141 FREEDMAN ET AL., supra note 121, at 475-502 (discussing the question of "tests of 
significance" which analyzes the issue of whether observed differences are real or just 
a chance variation). 
142Jd. 
143David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in THE 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SciENTIFIC EVIDENCE 331, 380-381 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 
1994) 
144See Fienberg eta!., supra note 123, at 23. See also MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 138, 
at 449 (describing the crucial first step of statistical reasoning). "[W]e ask whether some 
effect is present. ... To do this, we begin by supposing for the sake or argument that the 
effect is not present." I d. 
145 See DAVIDS. MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEP'IS AND CONTROVERSIES, 486 (4th ed. 1997); 
see FREEDMAN ET AL., supra note 121, at 482 (stating that P-values are determined by the 
hypothesis being based on an absurd conclusion then finding evidence against it). "Test 
of significance" is an argument by contradiction. Id. at 482. 
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?::5,.05 does not say that treatment is effective 95% of the time. This numerical 
expression does mean, however, that the observed treatment effects in the 
clinical trial were unlikely due to chance. 
Keep in mind the admonition of David Kaye and David Friedman: 
"Statistical significance depends upon the p-value [sic], and the p-value 
depends upon sample size."146 A small sample size rarely provides the 
statistician enough information to draw credible inferences. 
b. Confidence Intervals 
The business of statistics centers on drawing inferences, i.e., conclusions 
from samples of a particular population group that accurately apply to the 
entire group. P-values represent one type of statistical inference; confidence 
intervals are another. Because sample size affects P-value, some statisticians 
argue that calculation of confidence intervals conveys more useful information: 
a statistical device known as a confidence interval permits a more 
refined assessment of appropriate inferences about the association 
found in an epidemiology study. The advantage of a confidence 
interval is that it displays more information than P-values. What a 
P-value does not provide is the magnitude of the association found in 
the study or an indication of how numerically stable that association 
. 147 
lS. 
A confidence interval estimates a range of the values within which the results 
of astudywould likely fall if the study were repeated numerous times.148Thus, 
a confidence interval of 95% means that if a particular study was repeated 
twenty times, 19 out of 20 times the results would fall within a specified 
range.149 Statisticians usually reserve statistical confidence for levels of 95% or 
146Kaye & Freedman, supra note 143, at 384. 
147Bailey et a!., supra note 118, at 154. Professor Palletas takes issue with the 
proposition that confidence intervals generate stronger inferences than P-values. In his 
view, P-values and confidence intervals provide the same information. Id. Confidence 
intervals seem easier to follow because of the direct manner in which the information 
is presented. 
148Bailey eta!., supra note 118, at 173. 
149FREEDMANET AL., supra note 121, at 385. In Professor Moore's introductory text, he 
periodically provides clear and concise definitions of statistical concepts to help the 
student stay the course: 
A 95% confidence interval is an interval obtained from the sample 
data by a method that in 95% of all samples will produce an interval 
that captures the true population parameter. 
We call95% the confidence level. It is the probability that the method 
gives an interval that captures the true parameter. 95% confidence is 
short for "I got this result by a method that gives correct results 95% of 
the time." 
Id. See also MOORE, supra note 145. 
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better.lSO Today, whenever statistical methods appear in reports of medical 
studies, software capabilities also permit confidence interval estimates. 
Although confidence intervals plot the results of a clinical trial or medical 
study, assuming the studies were done a number of times, confidence intervals 
must be interpreted with caution. A confidence interval says that we got these 
numbers by a method that gives correct results 95% of the time,l51 A high 
confidence level without regard to sample size limits the ability of the 
statistician to interpret the value of the confidence interval. 
c. Relative Risk/Odds Ratio 
In epidemiology studies, typically, investigators examine the degree to 
which the risk of disease increases when individuals are exposed to chemicals, 
drugs, or other agents. Epidemiologists, for example, calculate the danger of 
exposure from a certain stimulus in terms of a relative risk ratio.152 
Epidemiologists define relative risk as follows: 
The ratio of the risk of disease or death among the exposed to the risk 
among the unexposed. For instance, if 10% of all people exposed to a 
chemical develop a disease, compared with 5% of people who are not 
exposed, the disease occurs twice as frequently among the exposed 
people: The relative risk is 10%/5% = 2. A relative risk of 1 indicates no 
association.153 
Considerable conflict arises over the appropriate use of epidemiology 
studies on the subject of causation.l54 Given the above passage, should courts 
accept a relative risk of 2.0 (a 50% increase of contracting a disease if exposed) 
as sufficient proof of causation? The authors of the epidemiology section of The 
150See MOORE, supra note 145, at 457-482 (assuming that confidence comes with 95% 
confidence interval). 
l5l[d. at 466. See MOORE & McCABE, supra note 138, at 440. Professor Moore states that 
the purpose of a confidence interval is to estimate an unknown parameter, such as a 
mean SAT-M score for California students, with an indication of how accurate the 
estimate is and how confident we are, whether 85% or 95%, that the result is correct. See 
also MooRE, supra note 145. 
l52See Bailey et al., supra note 118, at 148 n.64 (citing Gaul v United States, 582 F. Supp. 
1122, 1125 (N.D. Del. 1984)). Relative risk ratio was defined by the court as "the 
relationship between the risk of an occurrence, such as contracting a disease, in a 
population exposed to a certain stimulus, and the risk of the occurrence in a population 
not exposed to the stimulus." Gaul, 582 F. Supp. 1122, 1125. The court later used the 
example of comparing the likelihood of suffering from stomach cancer when a 
comparison is made between meat-eaters and vegetarians. ld. 
153Bailey et al., supra note 118, at 176. 
154Diana B. Petitti, Reference Guide on Epidemiology, 36 ]URIMETRICS J. 159-168 (1996). 
Among her many criticisms, she is most troubled by the Reference Guide's apparent 
endorsement of a finding of a relative risk of greater than 2.0 as sufficient to satisfy 
plaintiff's burden of proof on causation. ld. The author claims that no academic or 
scientific studies are available to support this statement. Id. 
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss2/8
1998] ADMISSIBILITY OF MEDICAL TESTIMONY IN OHIO 347 
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence state that the threshold for "concluding 
that an agent was more likely the cause of a disease than not is a relative risk 
rated at 2.0."155 When experts use a relative risk of 2.0 or greater in the exposed 
group as the basis for an opinion that the plaintiff's illness was caused by a 
chemical agent, commentators vehemently argue that proof of individual 
causation based solely on an epidemiology study exemplifies junk science.l56 
In the interest of being thorough, it should be noted that the strength of an 
association between exposure to a stimulus and disease can be calculated not 
only by relative risk ratio but also an odds ratio)57 The design of the study 
designates which formula statisticians use. Relative risk ratios express the 
strength of the association between exposure and disease in cohort studies,158 
whereas odds ratios describe a similar relationship in case control studies.l59 
155See Bailey et al., supra note 118, at 147 (acknowledging that relative risk states the 
strength of an association between exposure and disease; emphasizing that a high 
relative risk ratio does not permit one to conclude scientifically that a causal relationship 
exists). 
156Jd. The authors footnote a number of cases that have evaluated the role of 
epidemiology in proving individual causation. Id. at 167-170 nn.122-132. In particular, 
see DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding 
epidemiology studies did not provide direct evidence that a particular plaintiff was 
injured); Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Co., 580 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Iowa 1982) (finding 
epidemiology studies to be probative on the issue of initial causation; Ellis v. 
International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding certain epidemiological 
studies admissible despite criticism toward the studies' methodology); In re Joint E. & 
S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 758 F. Supp.199 (S.D.N.Y.1991), rev'd, 964 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(holding that relative risk less than 2.0 may be sufficient to prove causation). See also, 
Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating 
Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 429 (1983); Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: 
Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986); 
Kenneth S. Abraham & Richard A. Merrill, Scientific Uncertainty in the Courts, IsSUES Scr. 
& TECH. (Winter 1986). See generally DEBORAH G. MAYO & RACHELLE D. HOLLANDER, 
ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SciENCE AND VALVES IN RISK MANAGEMENT (Oxford Univ. Press 
1991) (exposing the entrance of individual and social values in the collection, 
interpretation, communication and evaluation of evidence of risk; and showing how 
individual and social values bear on the acceptability of the evidence of risk in our 
society). 
157See Bailey et al., supra note 118, at 149. The authors describe odds ratio as a 
comparison of the odds of having a disease when exposed to a suspected agent 
compared to the odds of getting the same disease with no exposure. Id. For example, 
although many people do not smoke nor are they exposed to secondary smoke, a certain 
number of people in this group will get lung cancer. 
158See Bailey et al., supra note 118, at 134-136. A cohort study is defined as prospective 
or follow-up study, for example, on the effects of secondary smoke. Id. Researchers will 
identify one group exposed to secondary smoke, and another group that is not. 
Thereafter they will follow both groups for a specified period of time looking for an 
increase in illness in the exposed group. Id. 
159See Bailey et al., supra note 118, at 136. Case-control studies are less expensive and 
involve less time. Here the researcher might begin with a group of lung cancer patients, 
then select a group that does not have lung cancer to form the control group. The 
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Odds ratios work like risk ratios. Researchers compare the odds of getting a 
disease when exposed to a suspected agent against contracting the disease 
without exposure.l60 Likewise, inferring individual causation in litigation from 
an odds ratio greater than 2 suffers from the same infirmities that curb the use 
of the strength of associations calculated by relative risk ratios.l61 
In summary, physicians make medical judgments through a highly 
disciplined process. Once a physician makes a diagnosis, the treatment plan 
consists of up-to-date therapies driven primarily by clinical experience and 
medical research. Publication of medical research serves as one of the main 
channels for updating physicians on rapidly changing methods of treatment. 
Physicians usually consider the quality of the science backing a publication; 
thus, expert witnesses' opinions on diagnosis, causation and damages depends 
to some degree on information found in medical literature usually never 
admitted into evidence. Federal as well as Ohio courts routinely examine the 
medical literature upon which the expert has relied when determining the 
reliability of a medical expert witness's opinion.162 On what basis can judges 
determine the reliability of medical literature relied upon by the expert? We 
examine this question in the next section. 
IV. ASSESSING REUABLE MEDICAL LITERATURE 
A. Comparing Federal Practice to Amended Rule 706 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence 
This section addresses the reliability of learned treatises admitted for the 
limited purpose of impeachment under newly amended Rule 706 of the Ohio 
Rules of Evidence. Indeed, courts have not only reviewed medical literature in 
case-control study is retrospective in nature when the investigators compare each 
group's past exposure to cigarette smoking. 
160The calculation of odds ratios is similar to relative risk ratios. But the design of a 
cohort study allows the estimation of risk when comparing groups of exposed versus 
unexposed individuals. This direct estimation cannot be made in a case-controlled 
study, therefore researchers use the odds ratio because it approximates relative risk, if 
the disease under study is uncommon in the population, and all cancers fit the meaning 
of "uncommon." DEVITA ET AL., supra note 128, at 235. 
161 Epidemiologists consider seven factors when determining whether an association 
between a stimulus and a condition or illness is causal: (1) the strength of the association; 
(2) temporal relationship; (3) consistency of the association; (4) biologic plausibility 
(coherence with existing knowledge); (5) consideration of alternative explanations; (6) 
specificity of the association; and (7) dose-response relationship. See Bailey et al., supra 
note 118, at 156-170. 
162See, e.g., Bresson, 554 N.E.2d at 1333 (citing The New Zealand Medical Journal and The 
American Journal of Optometry & Physiological Optics to verify accuracy of test used to 
determine defendant's driving under the influence); Pierce, 597 N.E.2d at 114-116 
(reviewing the scientific literature on the soundness of the calculation of frequency 
probability in DNA evidence); Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d at 1339 (referencing the Handbook of 
Clinical Child Psychology to determine the reliability of the defense of battered child 
syndrome). 
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determining reliability, but specifically noted whether the findings were 
statistically significant.163 Only recently have commentators begun to look at 
the reliability of opinions expressed in literature that serve as the basis of 
medical or scientific expert testimony.164 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay opinions contained in medical 
literature gain entrance to the courtroom through either Rule 703 or Rule 
803(18). Rule 703 of the Federal Rules allows a medical expert witness to rely 
on facts, data or opinions commonly relied upon by physicians when 
diagnosing and treating patients.165 Rule 803(18) of the Federal Rules 
recognizes as an exception to hearsay all "statements contained in published 
treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other 
science or art established as reliable authority."l66 Consequently, this Rule 
acknowledges that specialists who qualify as experts in the courtroom often 
rely on medical or scientific literature to formulate opinions in their field of 
expertise. Furthermore, Rule 803 allows this information to be used to impeach 
an opposing expert's testimony.167 Both Rule 703 and 803(18) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence take into account the expert's daily experience with and 
exposure to medical and scientific literature, and both permit experts to reach 
conclusions and opinions in court Gust as they do on a daily basis out of court) 
that would otherwise be inadmissible. 
163Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 519 (noting whether the epidemiology studies supporting the 
expert's opinions showed statistically significant increase in lung cancer deaths with 
exposure to PCBs). 
164See Walsh & Rose, supra note 95, at 226 (stating that publications do not become 
learned treatises by a talismanic pronouncement of a testifying expert and noting that 
the rules for determining reliable authorities are not clear). See also Robert F. Magill Jr., 
Issues Under Federal RuleofEvidence 803(18): The "Learned Treatise" Exception to the Hearsay 
Rule, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 49 (1993). 
165Moore v. Ashland Chern. Inc., 126 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 1997). The court was faced 
with the testimony of a well-qualified pulmonologist, who testified that the plaintiff's 
reactive airway disease had been caused by chemicals contained on the defendant's 
premises. The pulmonologist relied on differential diagnosis and a standard medical 
text regarding diseases and occupational medicine. The expert's opinion regarding 
causation was ruled admissible under Federal Rule 703 on the basis that opinions not 
in evidence, even if inadmissible, may form the basis of an expert's opinion "if 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field," quoting Michael H. Graham, 
Handbook of Federal Evidence, 109-110 n.l8 (4th ed. 1996). Id. at 691. 
166FED. R. Evm. 803(18). 
167Rule 803(18) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states the following: 
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examin-
ation or relied upon by the expert in direct examination ... statements 
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject 
of history, medicine, or other science or art established as a reliable 
authority by the testimony or admission or the witness or by other 
expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statement may 
be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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Recent developments, however, show Ohio is catching on to the idea that 
physicians are exposed to reliable data, information, and opinion in the daily 
practice of medicine. Reacting against an old regime that allowed medical 
witnesses to theorize in court with impunity for both plaintiffs and 
defendants,l68 the Ohio Supreme Court amended the Ohio Rules of Evidence 
to add Rule 706.169 This Rule codified Ohio's common law rule which restricted 
the use of learned treatises to impeachment.l70 It also incorporates the essence 
of Federal Rule 803(18), because it operates to prevent experts - especially 
physicians and scientists - from offering theories unsupported by prevailing 
concepts in their particular field. Since the introduction of Rule 706, witnesses 
may no longer limit the scope of cross-examination with self-serving 
declarations about a treatise's lack of reliability and authoritative quality. No 
longer may experts testify in a vacuum and present theoretical concepts 
tethered to nothing more than personal opinion. 
After it was amended, Rule 706 expanded the use of medical literature on 
two fronts: a court may now take judicial notice of a treatise as "reliable 
authority,"l71 and "[i]f an opposing expert witness refuses to recognize a treatise 
as reliable, the judge may permit the impeachment, provided counsel subse-
168Jd. at 239 (quoting Samuel S. Wilson, Medical Treatises as Evidence-Helpful but 
Strictly Limited, 29 U. CIN. L. REV. 255, 260 (1960). "The Ohio Supreme Court placed 'a 
premium on medical illiteracy. The less the witness ha[d] read, the less vulnerable [he 
was] to effective cross-examination."' Id. 
169In 1980, when the Ohio Rules of Evidence were adopted, Ohio refused to emulate 
or adopt Federal Rule 803(18). OHIO R. Evm. 706 staff note. Consequently, Ohio does 
not grant to learned treatises an explicit exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 102 of the 
Ohio Rules remains the controlling authority. See OHIO R. Evm. 706 staff note. Rule 706 
states in relevant part: 
Learned Treatises for Impeachment. Statements contained in publish-
ed treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, 
or other science or art are admissible for impeachment if the publication 
is either of the following: 
(A) relied upon by an expert witness in reaching an opinion; 
(B) established as reliable authority (1) by the testimony or admission 
of the witness, (2) by other expert testimony, or (3) by judicial notice. 
If admitted for impeachment, the statements may be read into evid-
ence but may not be received as exhibits. 
OHIO EviD. R. 706. See also OHIO R. Evm. 706 staff note. 
1700Hio Evm. R. 706 staff note. The new amendment to Rule 706 adopts Hallworth 
v. Republic Steel Corp., 91 N.E.2d 690 (Ohio 1950), which permitted the use of treatises 
if "recognized as standard authorities," although not relied upon by an expert. Hallworth, 
91 N.E.2d at 690 (syllabus & 2). The staff note to Rule 706 also points out that Rule 706 
leaves undisturbed Stinson v. England, 633 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1994). Stinson held that 
the substance of a treatise may be employed only to impeach the credibility of an expert 
who has relied upon the treatise or acknowledged its authoritative nature. Stinson, 633 
N.E.2d at 560. 
171See OHio Evm. R. 706 (B)(3) 
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quently lays the foundation through its own expert."172 Finally, the staff note 
explicitly states that the trial court determines under Rule 104(A) whether the 
treatise is a reliable authority.173 Thus, Rule 706 is a step in the right direction, 
as it implicitly accounts for the physician's routine practice of relying on data, 
information, and expert opinion in the daily management of patients. 
Despite its welcome arrival, Rule 706 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence may give 
Ohio judges cause for concern, because it fails to address a significant problem: 
expert witnesses in Ohio often rely on medical literature not necessarily 
established as "reliable authority." Note that Federal Rule 703 permits experts 
to rely on facts or data not admitted into evidence "if of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in a particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon 
the subject."174 Under this "reasonable reliance" test, federal courts have 
excluded opinions based on information that other experts in the field would 
not find reliable.J75 The Ohio Rules provide no such test. Consequently a 
problem emerges: a physician testifying in an Ohio court may rely on literature 
that has not been established as reliable authority; while, under Rule 706, a 
lawyer cross-examining that same expert is restricted to impeaching the expert 
with literature established as "reliable authority."176 Despite its safeguards,177 
Rule 706 does not empower an Ohio court to prevent an expert from relying 
on medical or scientific literature of questionable reliability. 
B. Medical Literature-Determining the Standard of "Reliable Authority" 
In Ohio, there is no clear means of establishing whether medical or scientific 
literature meets a standard of a reliable authority. This article, however, offers 
some considerations. First, reliability requires proof of trustworthiness.178 
Prior to Daubert, trustworthiness was known by the general acceptance of the 
piece and/ or the absence of personal bias. Federal case law prior to Daubert 
looked to the general acceptance of the treatise as authoritative or the prestige 
of the author to gauge its admissibility and trustworthiness.l79 In O'Brien v. 
172See OHIO Evm. R. 706 staff note. 
173See id. 
174FED. R. Evm. 703. 
175 See Reference Manual supra note 2. 
1760HIO R. Evm. 706 (B). 
177 See OHIO R. Evm. 706 staff note. 
17BSee, e.g.,Ward v. United States, 838 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1988). 
179Magill, supra note 164, at 58-65. The author catalogs several cases analyzing Dean 
Wigmore's "mark oftrustworthiness,"for e.g., Burgess v. Premier Corp, 727 F.2d 826 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (an authoritative text means one generally accepted within the industry); and 
Allen v. Safeco Ins. Co., 782 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1986) (author's prominence in the field 
supported by his connection with prestigious forensic science department). 
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Angley,lSO the Ohio Supreme Court declined to find an editorial from The 
Journal of the American Medical Association authoritative because the article 
demonstrated personal bias and prejudice toward litigation, thus undermining 
the logic of the learned treatise exception.l81 
In the post-Daubert review of medical literature, the courts question not only 
an article's reliability, but the expert's use of literature to support his or her 
opinions,l82 Consequently, medical or scientific literature ought to exhibit 
evidence of trustworthiness as demonstrated by the author; or it should at least 
reflect the academic trappings of an authoritative exposition by a leader in a 
particular field. In courtrooms where Daubert controls admissibility, the use of 
medical literature to form conclusions not drawn in the literature itself violates 
the dictates of the scientific method.l83 
C. Factors Establishing the Reliability of Medical or Scientific Literature 
Trial judges deciding whether medical or scientific literature meets the test 
of a "reliable authority" should consider more than the expert's thoughts on the 
article. Consequently, this article presents five factors which may aid a trial 
judge in determining the reliability of medical or scientific literature.184 They 
are: 1) whether the literature is authored by preeminent experts, raising a strong 
inference of reliability; 2) whether the literature is a textbook or a single arti-
180See O'Brien v. Angley, 407 N.E.2d 490 (Ohio1980). 
181Jd. The O'Brien court's primary justification for admitting such evidence as a 
limited exception to the hearsay rule was that learned treatises are inherently more 
trustworthy than customary forms of hearsay. "A powerful incentive exists to publish 
a work which will be accepted by the other members of the author's profession as a 
fundamentally sound and authoritative exposition of the subject." Id. at 494. 
l82See, e.g., authorities cited infra note 184. 
183Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779 (D.N.J. 1996) (asserting that 
reliance upon medical literature for conclusions not drawn therein departs from 
accepted scientific methodology). 
184 Although these factors are considered by medical and scientific professionals when 
they review medical and scientific literature, the same factors have also been considered 
by trial and appellate courts when evaluating the credibility of witness testimony, 
observations, or conclusions. See, e.g., Glauser-Nagy v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 987 F. 
Supp. 1002,1007-09 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (considering the results of randomized controlled 
clinical studies of breast cancer); Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817, 826-28 (Iowa 
1997) (recognizing the importance of peer review); McCrory v. State, 423 N.E.2d 156, 
158 (Ohio 1981) (noting the expert's reputation as a leading expert, an individual 
published in prestigious medical journals); McDaniel v. CSX Transp. Inc., 955 S.W.2d 
257 (Tenn. 1997) (noting that the expert's studies had been reviewed, reconstructed, and 
published in leading journals in the field; subjected to peer review; and recognized by 
medical textbooks and journals); Hand v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., No. 
03A01-9704-CV-00123, 1998 WL 281946 (Tenn. App. 1998) (noting that the doctor's 
diagnosis was recognized in medical textbooks and journals as well as by several 
national and world health organizations). 
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cle;l85 3) whether the publication or study was produced by a prestigious 
medical institution, thus imparting credence to the results and conclusions 
within the article; 4) whether the medical journal itself is granted considerable 
respect in the medical or scientific community;I86 and 5) whether the 
publication involves randomized controlled clinical studies with a large 
population base for both control and test groups.l87 No single factor should 
decide whether the text or literature is reliable. Rather, the court should balance 
all of these factors against the testimony and opinion of the witness to 
determine whether the literature is reliable. 
In comparison to Federal Rule 703, Ohio's newly amended Rule 706 only 
partially enables a jury to compare an expert's conclusions against the state of 
the art in medicine or science. Although the relevance I reliability standard and 
Rule 706 together will rarely bar unsound expert testimony from the 
courtroom, at a minimum, opposing counsel may effectively undermine the 
expert witness by exposing the lack of reliable medical literature supporting 
the expert's opinions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Long before the Supreme Court decided Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho, lawyers 
recognized that litigation was driven by expert witnesses. In fact, the 
availability of and demand for experts has produced a growing industry of 
professional experts. The abuse of expert witnesses takes an immeasurable toll 
on the efficiency of the judicial process. Intellectually dishonest experts 
engaged by the plaintiff and defense bar, taken together, exact an enormous tax 
on litigation. Experts not only increase the number of cases in the legal system, 
but they can raise the ante of litigation to a cost-prohibitive level. 
The concept of reliable medical and scientific evidence must be applied to 
both plaintiff and defense experts to achieve any success in curbing the abusive 
expert. The relevance/reliability approach will admit all medical expert 
testimony except for the rare physician whose conclusions are based on 
personal opinion unsupported by clinical methodology, medical literature, or 
professional experience. Thus, relying on Rule 706 of the Ohio Rules of 
Evidence, lawyers may introduce reliable literature, to expose antiquated or 
185Textbooks are general in scope, educational in nature, and often replete with 
generally recognized approaches to diagnosis and treatment. Medical literature 
however is specific and conveys new and more precise information often supported by 
statistical analysis. 
186The New England Journal of Medicine, for example, is widely known to maintain very 
high standards of peer review. 
187Randomized controlled clinical studies generate inferences significantly stronger 
than case-control or cohort studies. "Evidence-based medicine trains [doctors] to search 
medical databases and journals for randomized controlled trials of treatments that have 
helped patients with similar conditions to those of their own patients, statistically 
assuring that a treatment that works for a controlled group is likely to be successful with 
an individual patient." 15 MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY 3, at 10 (Jan. 1998). 
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discredited medical theories. Clearly the relevance/ reliability approach is 
well-suited to deal with all types of experts; and the freer use of literature in 
the courtroom depletes the credibility of expert testimony unsupported by 
good science or the sound practice of clinical medicine. 
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